Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 10

Issue 4

Article 3

September 1932

Discussion of Recent Decisions
Chicago-Kent Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Chicago-Kent Law Review, Discussion of Recent Decisions, 10 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 257 (1932).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol10/iss4/3

This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu,
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW
Published December, March, June and September, by the students
of Chicago-Kent College of Law, 10 No. Franklin St., Chicago, Illinois.
Matriculated students are subscribers by virtue of the incidental
fee charged them. Subscription price to others, $1.50 per year. Single
copies, 50c.
James R. Hemingway, '30 .....................................
Roger Severns, '32 ...................................

Editor
Assistant Editor

The section entitled "Discussion of Recent Decisions'' in this issue
is composed of essays written for the Callaghan prize by the following
students of the class of June, 1932: Paul Jones, Grove Talcott, and
Harvey Talcott.
The college assumes no responsibility for any statement appearing
in the columns of the REVIEW.
Volume X

September, 1932

Number 4

DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
DESCENDIBILITY OF VESTED REMAINDER SUBJECT TO BEING
DIVESTED.-A case recently decided by the Supreme Court of

Rhode Island' presents an interesting example of will construction involving remainder interests. By the first clause of his will,
the testator directed his executors to deposit in a trust company
such a sum of money or securities as would provide a certain
annuity to be paid to his housekeeper. By the second clause,
testator directed that upon the decease of his housekeeper the
trust should cease and the principal of the trust fund should go
into the rest and residue of his estate, and be distributed by his
executors "in accordance with said rest and residue as hereinafter set forth." The testator then directed that the rest and
residue of his estate be turned into cash by his executors and
divided into eight equal parts, and he gave and bequeathed oneeighth part to each of his nephews and nieces, whom he named.
He then directed that in case any of the beneficiaries should die
leaving issue, such issue should take by right of representation.
In case any of the beneficiaries should die without leaving issue,
then the sum allotted to him or her should go into the rest and
residue of his estate, and be divided equally among the surviving
nephews and nieces. Philip Wheaton Rives King, one of the
1 Petition of Hayden et al., 152 A. 254 (R. I., 1930).
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nephews named in the residuary clause, died on December 31,
1922, without issue. The testator's housekeeper named in the
first clause died September 23, 1927. Upon these facts, the question arose whether the estate of P. W. R. King is entitled to oneeighth part -of the trust fund, or whether it should be divided
equally among the testator's nephews and nieces who survived
his housekeeper.
The court, in an opinion delivered by Justice Sweeney, said:
"It is obviouii that the testator did not intend to die intestate as
to any portion of his property, as his will contains provisions
which show a contrary intention. The law favors the early
vesting of an estate given by will, and, in the absence of a clear
manifestation of the intention of the testator to the contrary,
estates are held to vest at the earliest possible moment. A remainder is vested when a definite interest is created in a certain
person and no condition is imposed other than the determination
of the precedent estate. In the case of the gift of a residue, the
general rule is, that such a gift will be construed to be vested,
unless a very clear intent is shown to postpone the vesting. The
test of a vested remainder is its present capacity to take effect in
possession whenever the prior estate shall determine; that is, if
the remainderman has the right, in case of a sudden determination of the prior estate, immediately to go in and take possession,
the remainder is vested."
Upon thispoint, the Justice has stated such undoubted principles of law that his citations of authority need not be repeated
here. But, as he applies them to the facts of the case the perceiving student will sense a grave doubt that the authorities were
pursued far enough. Containing no further citation, the opinion
proceeds to conclusion, thus:
"Applying these principles of law to the facts in this case, we
are of the opinion that the gift of the trust fund vested in the
testator's nephews and nieces living at the time of his death.
If Philip W. R. King had survived the testator's housekeeper,
his right to one-eighth of the principal of said trust fund could
not be questioned.
"Our opinion is that the share bequeathed to said Philip W. R.
King was not divested by reason of his death without issue prior
.to the death of the testator's housekeeper, and that the share of
said trust fund which would have been paid to said Philip W. R.
King if he had survived the testator's housekeeper should be paid
to the administratrix d. b. n. c. t. a. upon his estate."
In considering a question which involves will construction and
the ascertainment of future interests, a review of the significant
2 Fearne, Contingent Remainders, 215.
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developments in the history of remainders and their close kin,
executory devises, will be of material assistance.
Fearne defines remainders in this fashion: "Wherever there
is a particular estate, the determination of which does not depend
on any uncertain event, and a remainder is thereon absolutely
limited to a person in esse and ascertained; in that case, notwithstanding the nature and duration of the estate limited in remainder may be such as that it may not endure beyond the
particular estate, and may therefore never take effect or vest in
possession, yet it is not a contingent but a vested remainder."2
"On the contrary, wherever the precedent estate ... is limited
so as to determine only on an event which is uncertain and may
never happen; or wherever the remainder is limited to a person
not in esse or not ascertained; or wherever it is limited so as to
require the concurrence of some dubious, uncertain event, independent of the determination of the precedent estate and duration of the estate limited in remainder, to give it a capacity of
taking effect; the remainder is contingent."3 "The present capacity of taking effect in possession, if the possession were now
to become vacant, and not the certainty that the possession will
become vacant before the estate limited in remainder determines
universally distinguishes
a vested remainder from one that is
4
contingent."
At common law, numerous distinctions were to be noted in the
creation and operation of vested and contingent remainders,
some of which are now of diminished importance. Judicial interpretation and statutory enactments have mellowed and softened
some of the former differences, just as these two ever-present
forces have influenced many of the allegedly "harsh doctrines
of the old common law."
For example, a vested remainder could be preceded either by
a life estate or by a leasehold, whereas a contingent remainder
could be preceded and supported only by a freehold, the latter
estate accepting the seisin and holding it until the contingency
determined and the remainder became vested. Thus it was that
any attempt to create a contingent remainder without an intervening freehold estate was ineffectual and the attempted remainder utterly failed.
But following the Statute of Uses in 1535, conveyancers
availed their clients of unforeseen benefits of the operation of
that statute. Assume the case where it was desired to create an
interest to take effect in futuro upon an uncertain event, or in
favor of an unascertained person. A deed would be drawn
creating a use to begin at the desired time in favor of the intended
3 Ibid., 217.
4 Ibid., 216.
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grantee; at the appointed time, the use would take effect, the
statute operated at once upon the "dry use" to invest the cestui
with legal title, and presto! a future legal estate was created
with no particular estate to support it. It mattered little here,
then, that the future estate was contingent when it was created
or that it had formerly required a preceding estate of freehold.
For by employing this device, now known as a "springing use,"
no preceding estate at all was required. Further, if a use could
spring to a future time carrying with it the legal title, similarly
a use shifted from one cestui to another, upon some event, ought
to carry with it the emolument of legal title. And so the courts
held; wherefore we now know the "shifting use." In 1540, the
Statute of Wills provided man with the right to dispose of his
property by last will and testament, and with it went the right
to create these two new future interests by will. When so
created they were termed "executory devises."
Vested remainders have always been regarded as estates in
property, and therefore alienable, devisable, and descendible,
as any other estate.5 A contingent remainder, on the other hand
-being a mere possibility of getting an estate-was held at
common law rather restrictedly to the remainderman. A contingent remainder could not be conveyed to a stranger, but the
interest might be released to the life tenant in possession and
thus enlarge his estate into a fee.8 This common law doctrine
was affirmed in Illinois in the case of Williams v. Esten.7 However,
in England the common law was modified in 1845 by the Real
Property Amendment Act,8 which provided that "a contingent,
an executory, and a future interest, and a possibility coupled
with an interest . . ..whether the object of the gift or limitation
of such interest or possibility be or be not ascertained ... may
-be disposed of by deed."
In Illinois, under a statute providing for enurement of afteracquired titles,9 a warranty deed of his interest by an ascertained
contingent remainderman has been held effectual when the condition upon which the remainder was to vest was performed
before the termination of the particular estate. 10 The Supreme
Court of Illinois in 192811 affirmed a long line of cases 12 to the
effect that "a contingent remainder is not an estate, but is
5 Kales, Conditional Future Interests (1905), sec. 71.
6 Lampet's Case (1612), 10 Co. Rep. 48a; 26 Yale L. Jour. 34.
7 179 Ill. 267.
8 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106; 26 Yale L. Jour. 37.
9 Cahill's Ill. Rev. St. 1931, Ch. 3, par. 7.
10 Golladay v. Knock, 235 Ill. 412; Walton et al. v. Follansbee ot al.,
131 Ill. 147.
11 Raritan State Bank v. Huston, 329 Ill. 604.
12 DuBois v. Judy, 291 Ill. 340.
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merely the chance of having one, and cannot be the subject of
sale, cannot be levied upon by legal process, and cannot be
conveyed voluntarily by deed." This late case goes on to mention
the two apparent exceptions, the release, and the warranty deed
plus enurement. In equity, however, the view as to alienability
might be expected to differ. Mr. Justice Dunn has said: "Contingent interests and expectancies, though having no present
existence and resting only in possibility, are proper subjects of
contract. Contracts concerning such interests, when fairly made
upon a sufficient consideration, may be enforced in equity after
the subject matter of it has come into existence."1 8
Both under the English common law 14 and in Illinois 15 a contingent remainder has been held descendible if the person
entitled thereto were ascertained and the condition upon which
the remainder was to vest was not with reference to his person
but to a collateral event.
Fearne is cited by Kales' 6 as authority that under the Statute
of Wills a contingent remainder which was descendible was also
devisable; the only restriction in either case was that the death
of the ancestor, or testator, be not of itself an event which
forever prevents vesting of the remainder. But devisability of
contingent remainders in Illinois is still an open question.
The Wills Act"? empowers a qualified person " . . . to devise
all the estate, right, title, and interest, in possession, reversion,
or remainder, which he or she hath, or at the time of his or her
death shall have, of, in and to any lands, tenements. .. ."
Whether or not this broad description includes contingent remainders has never been expressly decided.' 8
A highly important difference at common law between vested
and contingent remainders was the destructibility of the latter
by means over which the remainderman could exercise no control.
This destruction would occur because of a disseisin of the life
tenant, or by his act of tortious feoffment. In either case, the
contingent remainder, being incapable of vesting in possession
13 Cummings v. Lohr, 246 Ill. 577.
14 Weale v. Lower, Pollexfen 54.
15 Drury v. Drury, 271 Ill. 336; Ackless v. Seckright, Breese 76.
16 Conditional Future Interests (1905), sec. 73.
17 Cahill's Ill. Rev. St. 1931, Ch. 148, par. 1.
18 Drury v. Drury, 271 Ill. 336, declared contingent remainders devisable, but the pronouncement was pure dictum. It purported to be based
upon Golladay v. Knock, 235 Ill. 412, and Ortmayer v. Elcock, 225 Ill.
342, in both of which it was likewise dictum. The Drury case also mentioned 4 Kent's Commentaries 261 (see vol. IV, 14th ed. 1896, page 297)
and the Ortmayer case referred to Sheppard's Touchstone 239 in support
of the principle. It is clear, however, that while the views of these
authorities are significant, they should not be taken to interpret an
Illinois statute.
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immediately upon the determination of the prior estate, however
premature, must fail. 19 The contingent interest might also be
destroyed by a merger of the life estate in possession with the
reversion,2 0 or with the ultimate remainder in fee, either by a
conveyance of one to the other, or the conveyance of both to a
stranger.
At an early day alert conveyancers began to reduce this perishability by interposing between the particular estate and the
contingent remainder a vested remainder "to trustees to preserve
contingent remainders." Sir Orlando Bridgman, afterwards
Lord Keeper, is credited with inventing this method about the
year 1650.21 The courts, alive to the need, sanctioned the device,
and another operative distinction between the two classes of
remainders was done away. In Illinois, "trustees to preserve
contingent remainders" were rendered unnecessary by a statute
enacted in 1921, 2 2 which provided "that no future interest shall
fail or be defeated by the determination of any precedent estate
prior to the happening of the event or contingency on which the
future interest is limited to take effect."
One of the earliest efforts of the courts to break down the
distinctions between vested and contingent remainders is disclosed in the case of Edwardsv. Hammond,'23 decided in 1683. In
this case, property was limited to A for life, remainder to B and
his heirs if he live to be twenty-one, but if he should die under
that age, then to A and his heirs. At the death of A, B was
seventeen years of age. The court held title in B, subject to
defeasance by his death before attaining twenty-one years. The
principle laid down was: if, after words importing a gift of an
absolute interest, a proviso is added which may defeat it, the
remainder is vested, subject to divestment on condition subsequent. Formerly it had been held that contingencies as to event,
or uncertainties as to persons to take, were to be construed as
conditions precedent to the vesting of the remainder. It is apparent that, under the old rule, the interest of this remainderman
would have failed because the condition had not been fulfilled
prior to or upon the termination of the particular estate ; whereas,
under the ruling in this case his enjoyment commenced immediately upon the death of the life tenant, though subject to
divestiture by his own death prior to the attainment of twentyone years.
19 Archer's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 66b; Doe d. Planner v. Seudamore, 2
B. & P. 289.
20 Egerton v. Massey, 3 C. B. (N. S.) 338; Bond v. Moore, 236 Ill. 576.
21 Powell's Future Interests, 166.
22 Cahill's Ill. Rev. St. 1931, Ch. 148, par. 24.
23 3 Lev. 132.
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Having in mind the basic doctrines underlying remainders,
and the importance still of distinguishing between them, we may
advert to the facts of the principal case with the purpose of
developing further those concepts especially pertinent. This
will include examination of the authorities of sister states and
comparison with the decision of the Rhode Island court.
It is to be observed that the question presented by this case
does not involve the conflicting doctrines revolving around the
oft-litigated phrase, "dying without issue." Possibility of indefinite failure of issue, or the effect of all lawful issue of a
beneficiary predeceasing him, are not factors in this problem in
will construction. The testator's words were "without leaving
issue," the import of which is as unmistakable as though the word
"surviving" were added. Since the remainderman, King, obligingly died without leaving issue, the vested or contingent
character of his interest depends solely upon a determination
of the time to which his death is to be referred, whether to the
death of the testator, or to that of the life tenant. If investigation
persuades us that the remainder was vested, we may anticipate
the inquiry, "Was it vested absolutely, or was it defeasible upon
condition subsequent?"
A reference to the definition of Pearne will indicate that the
interest is a vested remainder; and almost countless authorities
so hold on similar facts. 24 Quotations on this point, in addition
to those in the opinion of the instant case, would be superfluous,
but the six foot-note citations will show the general acceptation
of the principle.
The court is with us thus far, and we take next the question
of defeasance upon condition subsequent. In a parallel case,
minus the complications of a remainder over, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania decided that where a legacy is payable at a
future time certain to arrive, without condition precedent, it is
vested, where there is a person in esse at the testator's death
capable of taking at such future
time, though his interest may
25
be defeated by his own death.
The Rhode Island court, however, seemed to feel that, since
this remainder was determined to be vested, the conclusion was
inevitable that it was a descendible interest. A further examination of authorities, beginning with an early Massachusetts
decision, will reveal that such a conclusion is not inevitable and
that the clearly expressed desire of the instant testator was
unwarrantedly defeated. In Blanchard v. Blanchard26 there was
24 Montague v. Curtis, 181 N. Y. S. 709; Brian v. Tylor, 129 Md. 145;
Johrden v. Pond, 126 Minn. 247; Moulton v. Chapman, 108 Me. 417; In
re Churchill's Estate, 230 Mich. 148; McArthur v. Scott, 113 U. S. 340.
25 In re McCauley's Estate, 257 Pa. 377.
26 83 Mass. 223.
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a devise to A for life, and after her death to her children, B, C,
D, E, and P; but if any should die in the lifetime of A, the property was to be equally divided among the survivors. It was held
that the devise created vested remainders in the children, subject
to divestment upon condition subsequent, that is death of any
of them during the lifetime of A.
This doctrine of requiring the vested remainderman to survive
the period of distribution if he is to defeat a gift over was adopted
in Illinois in the old case of Ridgeway v. Underwood.27 There a
testator gave his wife an interest in his land during her life, in
lieu of dower, for her support, and then provided that at the
death of his wife and on his youngest child coming of age, the
land.should be sold and the proceeds divided among his seven
youngest children, their heirs and assigns forever, and that "if
one or more of said seven children should die before inheriting
his, her, or their inheritance, to be equally divided amongst the
remainder of the seven." It was held that the right of survivorship would be referred to the period of distribution, which was
after the death of the widow and the majority of the youngest
child, and not to the time of the testator's death.
In Reynolds v. Reynolds,28 the Supreme Court of Alabama had
occasion to pass upon facts consonant with those of the principal
case. The testator had provided, "it is my will and desire that
all my real estate shall belong to my beloved wife, [naming her],
for and during her natural life, and upon her death that the
same shall be equally divided between these dear children [naming five], and should any of the above-named children die
childless then in that event his or her share in my estate shall be
divided among those living of the above-named children." Henry,
one of the five children taking the remainder, died childless after
the testator, but before the death of the life tenant. It was held
that the remainder in fee was vested in the five children upon
the testator's death, subject to being divested by death prior
to the expiration of the life estate; and that by reason of Henry's
death his interest was div.ested, and passed over to the survivors.
It is desirable at this point to direct attention to the nice distinction between a vested remainder subject to divestiture, and
a remainder to "survivors," the latter being necessarily contingent until survivorship is actually established. Bender v. Bender29
is illustrative. The testator provided a life estate in favor of his
widow in all his real and personal property. The instrument
further read, "my wife, Mary Bender, [to] have exclusive control
of all property herein bequeathed to her by me, and at her death
27 67 Ill. 419.
28208 Ala. 674.
29 292 Iil. 358,
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the same to be divided equally among our surviving children,
share and share alike." The court in this case says: "A gift to
survivors which is preceded by a particular estate, at the expiration of which the gift is to take effect in possession, will take
effect in favor of those, only, who survive the particular estate. 0
The remainder is therefore contingent, since it cannot be known
until the death of the life tenant who will survive her to take the
estate." And to the same effect, Jarman in his treatise on Wills3 l
states: "the rule which reads a gift to survivors simply as applying to objects living at the death of the testator is confined to
those cases in which there is no other period to which such survivorship can be referred, and that where such a gift is preceded
by a life or other prior interest it takes effect in favor of those
who survive the period of distribution, and those only."
One more instance of a vested, defeasible interest, and in addition thereto the operation of a shifting executory devise, is
afforded by the case of Lachenmyer v. Gehlbach.3 2 The testator devised to his wife a life estate in all his property, and by the third
clause of his will provided: "After the death of my said wife all
of said property and estate above mentioned and described to
go to my children, share and share alike, and shall any of my
children die, then the children of such deceased child, should
any children be surviving such deceased child, to take the share
of the parent so deceased; and should any of my children die
leaving no issue, then the share of such deceased child shall be
divided equally among my surviving children." With respect
to the character of the remainders to the testator's children, the
court says: "'If the conditional element is incorporated into the
description of or into the gift to the remainderman, then the
remainder is contingent, but if, after words giving a vested
interest, a clause is added divesting it, the remainder is vested.
Thus, on a devise to A for life, remainder to his children, but if
any child dies in the lifetime of A, his share to go to those who
survive, the share of each child is vested, subject to be divested
by its death. But on a devise to A for life, remainder to such of
his children as survive him, the remainder is contingent.' 3 The
application of that rule to this case will fix the remainder as
vested in the children of the testator." The court held the remainders to the children subject, however, "to the shifting
executory devises in the event that any of them die before the
life tenant's death, either leaving children who would take or
without children, when the share would go to the surviving
30

Blatchford v. Newberry, 99 Ill. 11; Burlet v. Burlet, 246 Ill 563.

31 Vol. 3 (7th ed.), 2065.
32 266 IMl. 11.

83 Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities, sec. 108.
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children." This decision is cited with approval in the recent case
of Corson v. Thornburn. 4
Returning to the principal case, and reading again the testator's words, there can be no doubt as to what he intended. It
is evident by the plain language which he employed. He desired
each and all of his nephews and nieces, or their respective children, to have the enjoyment of his property. He knew that this
enjoyment could be had only by their being alive at the time
fixed for distribution, which was upon the death of his housekeeper. He expressly excluded the general estate of a deceased
beneficiary in naming alternate distributees. Yet, when the time
for distribution has arrived, we see the court placing the personal
representative of P. W. R. King on the same ground as a child of
said King, express terms of the will to the contrary notwithstanding.
It is not as though the testator had expressed a desire which
could not by law be given effect. As we have seen, descendibility
is not a vital attribute of a vested remainder. 5 It is of the essence
of an absolute and indefeasible vested remainder, but here the
remainder was expressly made defeasible. And as pointed out
previously, the condition beyond a reasonable doubt must have
been the death of King without leaving issue prior to the time
fixed for distribution. This condition was fulfilled, and should
have resulted in enlarging the shares of the seven other nephews
and nieces. It is submitted that the Reynolds and Lachenmyer
cases in fact and principle are on all fours with the instant case,
and that they more correctly state the law.
The construction of wills probably never can become an exact
science, because the personal equation can never be solved. But
the decision in the Hayden case recalls to the writer's mind one
of Horace Walpole's humorous characters, whose will when
opened was found to contain, in substance, this prayer: "Being
of sound mind and memory, I hereby make, publish, and declare
this, my last will and testament, and I earnestly desire the courts
not to trouble themselves to make a new one for me."

MAY A MARRIED WOMAAN MAINTAIN A BILL IN EQUITY FOR THE
PURPOSE OF ENFORCING COLLECTION OF A DEBT CREATED BY A
JUDGMENT FOR ALIMONY IN ANOTHER STATE?O-This question was

presented in the recent case of Weidman v. Weidman.' The Supreme Court of Massachusetts answered it in the negative. In
34 323 Ill. 338.
35 Lachenmyer v. Gehlbach, 266 Ill. 11; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 208
Ala. 674.
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1928, Mrs. Weidman, the complainant in this action, was granted
alimony pendente lite and solicitor's fees in a proceeding filed by
her husband in the Supreme Court of New York to annul the
marriage. The following year, in that proceeding, judgment
was entered in favor of Mrs. Weidman against her husband for
a special sum representing counsel fees and alimony due the
complainant, no part of which was paid.
A bill was then brought in the Superior Court of Middlesex
County, Massachusetts, to secure the amount due in the New
York judgment. The answer of the defendant averred that by
the allegations of the complainant's bill, the complainant was
still the wife of the defendant and that under the law of Massachusetts it could not be maintained. The bill was dismissed by
the lower court. It was decided by the court that a decree for
alimony for a gross sum established an obligation that was
plainly in the nature of a debt. The proper method of collecting
this debt was by an action at law. Such an action at law could
not be maintained between husband and wife, 2 and that circumstance alone was not ground for relief in equity.
It was further decided that jurisdiction in equity exists over
suits between husband and wife to secure her separate property,
to prevent fraud, to relieve coercion, to enforce trusts, and to
establish other conflicting rights concerning property. However,
no such subject of equity jurisdiction was set forth in the bill of
complaint; consequently, the decree of the lower court dismissing
the bill was right.
An order for the payment of money as alimony, rendered by a
court having jurisdiction, is entitled to recognition in another
state of the United States under the "full faith and credit clause"
of the Constitution as to all accrued installments which are not
subject to further modification by the court originally rendering
the order.3 This requirement of the Federal Constitution, however, does not preclude inquiry into the jurisdiction of the court
in which the judgment for alimony was rendered. Obviously,
the judgment can have no extra-territorial effect if it was rendered by a court which never acquired personal jurisdiction of
the defendant.' Aside from the question of jurisdiction, however, the foreign decree is res judicata.
1 274 Mass. 118.
2 It is provided by G. L. Ch. 29, par. 6, that "married women may
sue and be sued in the same manner as if they were sole; but this section shall not authorize suits between husband and wife."
3 Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, p. 310.
4 2 Ann. Cas. 819 note. 3 Ann. Cas. 579 note.
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Where a foreign decree is subject to modification by the court
in which it was entered, neither the Federal Constitution nor
the principle of comity requires the courts of another state to
enforce it.5 A periodical allowance cannot be enforced as to
installments not yet accrued; not only because they are not yet
due, but because it is universally acknowledged that an allowance
is subject to modification before its accrual." Nor may a decree
be enforced in another jurisdiction as to installments already
accrued, where the law of the forum wherein it was rendered
expressly authorizes the modification of an allowance both as
to accrued and future installments. 7 Under such circumstances,
a foreign decree may be enforced only as to such amount as it
adjudicates to be actually due at the time of its rendition. s
A few courts, however, erroneously interpreting a decision of
the United States Supreme Court,9 have held that a periodical
allowance, so far as it awards alimony to become due and payable
after its rendition, is not within the protection of the "full faith
and credit clause" of the Federal Constitution so as to require
its enforcement as to such installments in another state.' 0 In a
subsequent decision," however, the United States Supreme Court
cleared up the tendency to confusion. A decree is deemed a final
judgment so as to be within the "full faith and credit clause" so
far as accrued installments are concerned, unless it appears from
the law of the jurisdiction wherein a decree was granted that
the power of modification extends to accrued as well as to future
installments of alimony. This, of course, is with the understanding that no modification of the decree has been made prior to
the maturity of such installments.
The problem before us, however, is of much narrower scope
since it involves only those cases where a decree for alimony has
been entered in connection with a divorce a mensa et tkoro, for it
is only in those cases that the parties remain husband and wife.
In beginning our examination of the authorities it would probably be most logical to examine the English law. The general
rule which prevailed in England was that a suit could not be
maintained at law by a jeme covert and that, notwithstanding a
divorce a mensa et thoro, a wife could not sue or be sued in a court
5 Israel v. Israel, 148 Fed. 576; Page v. Page, 189 Mass. 85.
6 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1069 note. But see Cummings v. Cummings, 97
Cal. App. 144.
7 Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U. S. 183.
8 Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U. S. 183.
9 Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U. S. 183.
10 Israel v. Israel, 148 Fed. 576, 8 Ann. Cas. 697 and note; Page v.
Page, 189 Mass. 85.
11 Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U. S. 1.

DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS

of law. In several cases, however, she might maintain a suit in
her own name as a feme sole, both in law and equity. These were
exceptions to the general rule, where under certain circumstances, it could not be presumed from his own acts, that the
husband's control of his wife was continued, and where she had
been deprived of his protection to represent with
her her rights
12
and interests in a suit at law or one in equity.
There were also exceptions in equity which were wholly unknown at law. Thus, if a married woman claimed some right in
opposition to the rights of her husband, she could not maintain
a suit against him at law, but in equity she might sue. It was
necessary, however, for her to sue under the protection of some
other person who acted as next friend, and the bill was exhibited
in her name by such next friend.
Another ground of jurisdiction in equity was that courts of
equity would interfere to compel the payment of alimony which
had been decreed to a wife by an ecclesiastical court. This jurisdiction is ancient and the principal reason for its exercise was
that when a court of competent jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties, decreed a divorce, and alimony to the
wife as its incident, and was unable of itself to enforce the decree
summarily upon the husband, courts of equity would interfere
to prevent the decree from being defeated by fraud. The interfereice was, however, limited to cases in which alimony had
been decreed; then only to the extent of what was due, and
always to cases in which no appeal was pending from the decree
of divorce. 8
At the present time in England, the law is substantially as
stated above. The only important difference is in the manner
and form of procedure. Since the Married Woman's Act, a
married woman may sue and be sued as a feme sole, so that it is
no longer necessary to bring suit under the protection of a next
friend.
.41
.One of the earliest cases in this country in which the question
of whether or not a married woman might properly maintain
a bill in equity to enforce a foreign alimony decree was the case
of Barber v. Barber."' Mrs. Barber applied for divorce, by her
next friend, in the court of chancery in the State of New York.
The court had jurisdiction of both the parties and the subject
matter. A divorce a mensa et thoro was decreed, awarding ali12 See Story's Equity Pleading (6th ed.), see. 61.
13 Shaftoe v.
Jr. 173.

Shaftoe, 7 Yes. Jr. 171; Dawson v. Dawson, 7 Ves.

14 21 n1ow. 58Z.
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mony to the wife. Immediately thereafter, the husband removed
to Wisconsin for the purpose of placing himself beyond the
jurisdiction of the court without having paid any part of the
alimony. There he applied for a divorce a vinculo, not disclosing
the circumstances of the divorce in New York, but alleging his
wife had wilfully abandoned him. Hulda Barber then brought
a bill in equity in the District Court of the United States for the
district of Wisconsin, by her next friend, to give the same validity to the judgment in that state which it had in New York
and to enforce the collection of the judgment. The court held
that when alimony is not paid, the wife can sue her husband for
it in a court of equity as an incident of that condition which gave
her the right to sue him for a divorce. It was further decided
that a woman who had obtained a divorce a mensa et thoro might
acquire a residence separate from that of her husband so that
the District Court had jurisdiction because of diversity of citizenship. It is interesting to note that an action at law had first
been filed in the Circuit Court of the State of Wisconsin. The
suit was dismissed, the court holding that the proper method
of enforcing a foreign decree for alimony was by a bill in equity.
In Cummings v. Cummings, 15 the plaintiff recovered a judgment
against the defendant, her husband, in New York, granting to
the plaintiff sixty-five dollars per week for the support of herself
and her two children. The defendant became a resident of California, and the plaintiff brought suit against him there, setting
up two causes of action and praying for equitable relief, first,
for payments past due, and second, for equitable relief asking
that future payments be decreed. The District Court of Appeal,
holding that a judgment for alimony was not subject to modification for the sum already accrued, allowed for such sum and
also decreed that future payments be made, at the rate fixed by
the New York decree, for as long as that decree remained unmodified. The court said, ". . . he [defendant] argues that because our state courts are not bound to enforce the judgment of
our sister state so far as applies to future payments, therefore
our courts are bound not to enforce it. His premise is good, but
his logic is bad, and it leads him into a position which is untenable." This decision is a recent one and shows a tendency on the
part of the courts of some jurisdictions to extend the relief
beyond the mere collection of the amount of alimony already
due and unmodified.
While the divorce granted in New York was one from bed
and board, there is no indication in the case that a ground for
coming into equity was because of an inadequate remedy at law
due to a disability to sue as a wife. The court does indicate,
however, that the California courts of equity will take jurisdic.
15 97 Cal. App. 144.
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tion to prevent fraud in cases of this type and also to give full
effect to the foreign decree. It is apparent from the opinion of
the court that the remedy at law is far from being full, adequate
and complete.
In the case of Fanchierv. Gamill,16 the situation differed from
that in Barber v. Barber and Cummings v. Cummings in that the
divorce granted was absolute and not from bed and board. A
bill in equity was filed in the Mississippi court to enforce a decree
for alimony rendered in Nevada. The defendant demurred to
the bill and the demurrer was overruled by the chancellor. Upon
appeal the only ground for demurrer which the Supreme Court
deemed sufficiently meritorious to discuss was the one "that the
chancery court of our state has no jurisdiction in the matter
because the decree of the Nevada court amounts to no more than
a judgment at law." The court in its opinion said, "It is our view
that, on account of the character of a judgment for alimony,
which rests, to some extent, upon public policy, in requiring a
husband to support his wife and children, due to the sacred
human relationship, and that they may not become public
charges and derelicts, the decree for alimony, with the extraordinary power of enforcement by attachment and contempt proceedings, should be established and enforced by our equity court,
which has full and sole jurisdiction of all matters of divorce and
alimony; because to hold that a foreign judgment for alimony
can be enforced in this state only by execution, the same as judgments at law, would be to impair or to deprive a foreign judgment
for alimony of its inherent power of enforcement by attachment
and contempt proceedings."
In Mayer v. Mayer,17 a bill in equity was filed in a Michigan
court to enforce a judgment for alimony rendered in conjunction
with a decree of divorce a vinculo entered in Oklahoma. The court
found $1700.50 due to the complainant as alimony and $3172.34
for the support of the children. The decree of the court not
being complied with, the defendant was adjudged guilty of contempt. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Michigan, finding
that the Oklahoma court had the power, by statute, to revise the
amount allowed for the support of the children, reversed the
decree so far as it allowed for the support of the children. "The
remaining question," said the Michigan court, "is whether the
remedy by proceedings as for contempt is open in this case. In
the absence of a statute authorizing attachment for non-payment
of permanent alimony, it has been held in this state that such
remedy is not open. We have a statute, however, which provides
that 'every court of record shall have the power to punish by fine
or imprisonment, or either, any neglect or violation of duty...
in the following cases:. .. the disobedience or refusal to comply
16 148 Miss. 723.
17 154 Mich. 386.
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with any order of such court for the payment of alimony, either
permanent or temporary, made in any suit for divorce.' It is to
be noticed that the authority conferred by this statute is limited
to suits for divorce. The present suit is not a suit for divorce....
The order adjudging the defendant guilty of contempt will be
set aside." This case indicates that while the power of the court
to punish by contempt has been limited by statute the jurisdiction
of the court of equity over these classes of cases has not in any
way been curtailed.
In Wkite v. White' s the complainant obtained separate maintenance and alimony in New Jersey and brought a bill in equity
in the courts of Massachusetts to enforce the payment of the
alimony. A general demurrer to the bill was overruled and the
defendant answered. The lower court held that it had no authority to enforce payment of the judgment for alimony by
contempt proceedings because it was based on a foreign decree.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts said, "It follows
that the court had jurisdiction to enforce its decree for a money
payment by issuing an attachment for contempt, and the ruling
of the superior court that it 'had no jurisdiction to punish the
defendant for contempt in failing to pay money according to a
decree of that court, when the decree is based upon a decree of a
New Jersey court in separate support or divorce proceedings in
New Jersey' was wrong."
It is to be noticed that in this case the question of whether
or not such a bill might be maintained was not decided because
the question was not certified to the court. The decision implies,
however, that had the defendant elected to stand by his demurrer, the decision of the lower court in overruling it would
have been affirmed, for to hold otherwise after deciding that
the decree might be enforced by contempt proceedings would
be an anomaly.
It was formerly a general rule of the common law that an
action at law would not lie upon a decree of a court of equity, 19
applied to decrees for alimony renand this rule was formerly
20
dered in another state.

One of the few cases which are to be found where a court of
equity is denied the right to entertain a bill for the purpose of
21
enforcing a foreign alimony decree is that of Davis v. Davis.

A demurrer to the bill was overruled by the trial court, but the
Court of Appeals held this was error and that the remedy at law
was adequate. But in this case the relation of husband and wife
18 233 Mass. 39.
19 Hugh v: Higgs and Wife, 8 Wheat. 697.
20 Van Buskirk v. Mulock, 18 N. J. L. 184.
21 29 App. D. C. 258.
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had been severed and hence this decision does not directly answer
the question under consideration.
Dow v. Blake22 is authority for the rule that an action in debt
may be maintained upon a decree for alimony rendered in another
state. The court bases its decision upon the fact that the decree
has the same force and effect as a judgment at law and that the
reason for the ancient jurisdiction of the equity courts no longer
exists. This decision does not deny the power of a court of
equity to grant such relief. It is generally followed in the various
states in enforcing foreign alimony decrees in conjunction with
absolute divorces.
It is apparent from the cases which have been cited that the
courts which have rendered opinions upon the question are not
in harmony and that it will be difficult to reconcile them and
arrive at the true answer.
At common law there was no absolute divorce. There was
what was called annulment of marriage and divorce a mensa
et thoro. The ecclesiastical and equity courts had sole jurisdiction in granting the relief prayed for and in enforcing their
decrees. The law courts had no jurisdiction either to grant
the same relief or to enforce the decrees of the equity courts.
The equity courts of this country have exercised a like power
from an early date. "In Maryland, the high court of chancery,
from the earliest colonial times, exercised the jurisdiction to
decree alimony but not to grant divorces... and in 1777 an act
of the Assembly provided that the chancellor shall and may hear
and determine all causes for alimony in as full and ample a manner as such causes could be heard and determined by the laws
In Alabama
of England, in the ecclesiastical courts there."2
and North Carolina equity courts have had jurisdiction from an
alimony. 24 The same jurisdiction is granted
early date to decree
25
in New York.

Since equity, under the early law, had no jurisdiction to grant
absolute divorces, the power to do so in this country is purely
statutory. In fact in most states all matters relating to divorce
are now regulated by statute.
In the principal case, the New York court had power to grant
alimony by statute without granting a divorce. The Massachusetts court had no such power, and it denied the complainant's
right to enforce the New York decree upon the ground that the
Massachusetts court must comply strictly with its own statute.
22 148 ill. 76. See also Wagner v. Wagner, 26 R. I. 27.
23 Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 582.
24 Denton v. Denton, 1 Johns. Ch. 364, 441.
25 Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 582.
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However, the bill was not for divorce but to enforce a foreign
decree, and the court retained the power to grant that relief
unless its power to do so had been abrogated by statute. In
the White case, it was held that the courts of Massachusetts had
the power by statute to enforce by attachment for contempt a
decree for alimony rendered in another state. It is apparent
from this that the court still has power to grant the relief prayed
for, and the mere fact that there is also a remedy at law in an
action in debt will not oust the equity court of jurisdiction. In
Boyce's Executors v. Grundy,2 the court said, "It is not enough
that there is a remedy at law; it must be plain and adequate, or
in other words, as practical and as efficacious to the ends of
justice and its prompt administration, as'the remedy in equity."
The argument of the court that it was no ground for relief in
equity that a woman could not sue her husband at law, loses
much of its force in view of what has just been said. It is also
apparent from the cases that an attempt on the part of the husband to avoid payment of alimony amounts to a fraud that courts
of equity will prevent upon a proper bill being filed.
The Cummings case introduces an entirely new idea into the
method of enforcing foreign decrees which involve the future
payment of money. The doctrine of enforcing future payments
until the decree of the court originally granting the relief has
been changed is rather extreme, and it is doubtful if it will be
followed by many of the states.
While today the majority of cases involving the enforcement
of foreign alimony decrees are actions in debt, the cases studied
indicate that the courts of equity still retain their ancient jurisdiction to enforce certain foreign decrees, as for alimony, except
where the jurisdiction has been abrograted by statute. It would
seem that Mrs. Weidman's bill of complaint was one which might
properly have been maintained.

WHERE A TESTATOR DRAws LINES THROUGH THE NAMES OF SOME
OF THE BENEFICIARIES NAMED IN THE WILL, DOES THIS ACT CONSTITUTE A PARTIAL REVOCATION

OR WILL IT

BE HELD TO BE AN

ALTERATION WHICH FAILS FOR WANT OF PROPER ATTESTATION?-

This question was recently presented to the Supreme Court of

Illinois for determination in the case of Casey v. Hogan,1 where
an appeal was taken from a judgment of the Superior Court
of Cook County sustaining a demurrer to a bill filed to contest
a will, and dismissing the bill for want of equity. The facts
26 3 Peters 210.
1 344 fll. 208.
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alleged by the bill and admitted by the demurrer were that
Laura Hogan died leaving a validly executed will; that after
execution thereof she drew lines through the names of some
of the beneficiaries named therein, leaving the same legible;
and that the entire will, including the parts canceled, was
admitted to probate in the probate court of Cook County.
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of dismissal in a brief
opinion stating that the statute governing the revocation of
wills2 makes no reference to partial revocation and that it has
long been held in this state that an attempt to revoke a part of
a will only, by any of the acts therein named will be of no
effect unless the instrument is subsequently reattested?
The problem presents three possibilities-first, the will
should be established as originally written and executed without regard to the attempted cancelation; or, second, it should
be disallowed as having been entirely revoked thereby; or,
third, it should be admitted to probate excepting therefrom4
the words canceled on the ground of revocation pro tanto.
As we have seen, the Illinois court has affirmed the first proposition as being the correct solution. This solution is not
entirely free from difficulty.
Although the revocation as well as the execution of wills
both of realty and of personalty is now governed by statute,
this was not always the case. Prior to the enactment of the
Statute of Frauds in England a will was revocable by parol 5
The result was that many wills were overthrown by perjured
testimony, and Lord Nottingham expressed the hope "that
some day no will should be revoked except by a writing." The
next year the Statute of Frauds was enacted by Parliament,
which provided that "no devise in writing of lands, tenements
or hereditaments nor any clause thereof, shall at any time
after the said four and twentieth day of June be revocable,
otherwise than by some other will or codicil in writing, or
other writing declaring the same, or by burning, canceling,
tearing, or obliterating the same, by the testator himself,....-6
The English courts, since the enactment of this statute, have
consistently held that a clause of a will, as well as the whole
2 Cahill's Ill. Rev. St. 1931, Ch. 148, par. 19. "No will, testament or
codicil shall be revoked, otherwise than by burning, canceling, tearing
or obliterating the same, by the testator himself, or in his presence, by
his direction and consent, or by some other will,... and no words spoken
shall revoke or annul any will . . .'
3 Wolf v. Bollinger, 62 Ill. 368; Hesterberg v. Clark, 166 Ill. 241;
Marshall v. Coleman, 187 Ill. 556; Schmidt v. Bauermeister, 279 Ill. 504.
4 In re Knapen's Will, 75 Vt. 146.
5 Brooke v. Ward, 3 Dyer 310 b.
6 29 Car. II, c. 3, s. 6.
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will, could be revoked by any one of the acts therein specified.7
Later the Wills Act of Victoria was passed which provided that
"no will or codicil, or any part thereof, shall be revoked...,,s
and further that "no obliteration, interlineation or other alteration made in any will after the execution thereof, shall be
valid or have any effect, except so far as the words . . . shall
not be apparent unless such alteration shall be executed in like
manner as hereinbefore required for the execution of the will."9
In the United States, the right to revoke pro tanto is largely
dependent on the statutes. According to one authority, "this
doctrine of partial revocation, even under the restrictions
adopted by later English legislation, is not greatly favored in
American codes at the present day. Various codes now drop
all reference to revocation in part; and the general policy
indicates that such changes of disposition require an instrument executed with all the formalities of a will."' 1 On the
other hand, Percy Bordwell in the "Statute Law of Wills""'
found that in 1928 thirty-three states had previsions similar
to the English Statute of Frauds and that all except that of
New York 12 had been construed to allow partial revocation by
any of the acts mentioned.in the statute. It will be noted that
the sanction, if any, is purely in negative terms, but the construction has been so consistently upheld that new legislation
would be required to effect a change.
The states may be divided into two classes: those which
have statutes making no provision for partial revocation, 3 and4
those which have statutes providing for it in negative terms.
7 Larkins v. Larkins, 3 Bos. and Pul. 16; Swinton v. Bailey, 4 App.
Cas. 70.
8 7 Win. IV & 1 Vic. c. 26, par. 20.
9 Ibid. par. 21. See In re Goods of Horsford, L. R. 3 Prob. & Div. 211,
where the testator pasted slips over some of the bequests in the will and
wrote new gifts thereon. The court refused to allow the slips to be taken
off and decreed probate of the will with these blanks. The new gifts also
failed for want of attestation. The court said that the parts so covered
were not apparent on the face of the will, and had Parliament intended
to permit the use of chemical means to show what the words were, the
statute could easily have been made to read "except so far as the words
shall not be capable of being made apparent." But see Ffinch v. Combe,
L. R. [18941 Prob. Div. 191, involving the same will where the court
allowed an original devise when an expert testified he could read it by
covering the page excepting the strip and placingthe same over a strong
light.
10 Schouler on Wills (3rd ed.), par. 397.
11 14 Iowa L. Rev. 290.
12 Lovell v. Quitman et al., 88 N. Y. 377. The New York statute contains peculiar wording, however, which apparently justifies the court's
interpretation.
18 Illinois, Alabama, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Georgia, and Ohio.
14 Minnesota, Maryland, South Carolina, New Jersey, North Carolina.
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Under the statutes of the first class the great weight of authority is that there can be no partial revocation by an act on the
face of the instrument. 15 It is under statutes of the latter type
that most of the conflict of authority exists.16 A more particular examination of some of the statutes, and the decisions
interpreting them will serve to illustrate the conflicting views.
In Alabama, it is provided, "A will in writing can only be
revoked by burning, . . . with the intention of revoking it
".
"
A testator duly executed his will and subsequently
drew a line through the name of his son, a beneficiary. The
will was never, thereafter, reattested. The court held that the
code provided only for a revocation of "a will" and made no
mention of partial revocation.' 8 It was provided elsewhere for
the revocation of a will, in whole or in part, by a later will or
codicil. The court remarked that the language used was a
change from earlier codes, which had.been patterned after the
English Statute of Frauds. This change was considered significant and the court pointed out the great difference between
revocation by will or codicil, and revocation by an act on the
face of the instrument. The latter, unless it goes to the complete destruction of the will, is in its very nature an equivocal
act. Some evidence, apart from the will itself is usually necessary to explain its extent and meaning.
The New York statute relating to the revocation of wills
provides that "no will in writing . . . nor any part thereof,
shall be revoked or altered, otherwise than by some other will
in writing, or some other writing of the testator declaring
such revocation or alteration and executed with the same
formalities with which the will itself was required, by law, to
be executed; or unless such will be burnt, torn, canceled,
obliterated, or destroyed with the! intent and for the purpose
of destroying the same .... 19 In the case of Lovell v. Quitnmn,'0
the trial court found that the deceased left a duly executed
will, but had thereafter attempted to revoke two clauses by
obliteration leaving them still legible. The Court of Appeals
held the attempted revocation to be of no effect. The judge
pointed out that the first part of the section providing for
revocation by will or codicil refers to both "a will" and "any
part thereof," while that part of the law governing revocation
15 See note 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) p. 797, et seq.
16 Ibid. p. 798. See also Page on Wills, (2nd ed.) I, 659. Jarman on
Wills, (7th ed.) I, 134. Woerner, American Law of Administration (3rd
ed.) I, 125.
17 Code 1886, par. 1968.
18 Law v. Law, 83 Ala. 432.
19 2 R. S., part 2, Ch. 6, tit. 1, art. 3, p. 64, sec. 42.
20 88 N. Y. 377.
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by act on the will itself refers only to "a will." The court
refused to assume that this change was not intended by the
legislature to be of some significance, and therefore gave effect
to it, saying, "The mischief intended to be prevented by the
observance of formalities in the execution of a will would reappear if the instrument could be altered in any less formal way."
The Connecticut statute providing the manner in which wills
may be revoked is as follows: "No will or codicil shall be
revoked in any other manner except by ' burning
... it by the
22
21
In Appeal of Miles
testator... or by a later will or codicil.

it was held that an entire clause erased remained a part of the
will. There was, however, a finding that the erasure was not
made by the testatrix, nor in her presence and by her direction.
The court, although the question was not before it, went on to
approve the doctrine that under this type of statute partial
revocation could be only by will or codicil, and to express
doubts 2 as to the correctness of the rule declared in Bigelow v.
Gillott.

3

The code of Georgia provides that "No will or codicil shall
be revoked," etc. 24 In the case of Hartz v. Sobe 2 5 it appeared
that the testatrix had cut out the names of certain beneficiaries
with a penknife or other sharp instrument. The court held
that as the statute made no provision for partial revocation by
such means, the attempted revocation was ineffectual,
the will .,never having been republished in its mutilated condition. As the words were completely cut out, the court permitted the blanks to be proved by extrinsic evidence. In the
opinion, it was noted that the legislature had wisely withdrawn the power to revoke a portion of a will by anything on
the instrument itself. The court believed that revocation
should be attended with all the formalities required of the
execution of a testamentary document.
A conclusion opposite to the one reached in the foregoing
cases was the doctrine declared by the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts in the case of Bigelow v. Gillott2" under a similar statute.27 It is significant that prior to this act, the law
governing revocation followed the English statute and provided that "No will, or any clause thereof" should be revoked
except in the manner therein stated.2" The court gave no effect
to this seemingly important change by the legislature and,
21

Gen. St. 1887, par. 542.

68 Conn. 237.
23 123 Mass. 102.

22

Civil Code of 1910, sec. 3919.
136 Ga. 565.
26 123 Mass. 102.
24
25
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forgetting that the power to revoke is entirely dependent on
the statutory grant, went on to draw authority from the broad,
and rather vague, generality, that "The power to revoke a
will, includes the power to revoke any part of it."
Maryland, on the other hand, still follows the old English
statutes as to partial revocation. 29 In the leading case of
Eschbach et al. v. Collins and Bernard et al.3 ° it appeared that
the testator drew lines through the names of two of his sons
wherever they appeared in the will. The will originally named
them executors, gave them their shares in fee, and devised to
them the rest of the estate in trust for the remaining sons and
daughters who were not mentioned in the will by name. The
effect of the erasures on the wording of the will was to give all
the sons their shares in fee simple absolute instead of as
equitable life estates. The court held this to be not a mere
revocation, but an alteration, just as much as if the testator
had interlined new bequests in the will after execution, and
because it was not attested it had no effect on the will as originally drawn. In the later case of Home of the Aged of M. E.
Church of Baltimore City v. Bantz,31 in which the revocation,
effected by obliteration of a certain clause, did not increase the
share of any of the other beneficiaries, the court admitted the
altered will to probate.
South Carolina also falls in the category of those states
which provide for partial revocation in negative terms.82 In
the case of Brown v. Brown,3 3 the testator drew lines through
legacies in a will having a residuary clause, leaving them
legible. The court held that under the code, a will or any
clause could be revoked; that had the legislature wished to
except wills containing residuary clauses, it would have been
so stated because of their common occurrence in wills. The
power to revoke in whole or in part, was, in the opinion of the
court expressly given in general terms. "The increase of the
residuary estate," the court said, "which may result from the
obliteration is not a new testamentary disposition, but a mere
incidental consequence resulting from the exercise of the
power conferred on the testator by the statute."
27 "No will shall be revoked, unless by burning etc.; or by some other
will . . . signed, attested and subscribed in the manner provided for
making a will." Gen. St., c. 92, par. 11.
28 St. 1783, Ch. 24, par. 2.
29 Code 1878, Art. 49, par. 5. "No devise in writing of lands, teneo ments, or hereditaments, or any clause thereof shall be revocable, except,

etc.''

30 61 Md. 478.
31 107 Md. 543.
32 S. C. Civil Code

33 91 S. C. 101.

1902, see. 2401.
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In Barfield v. Carr,"' a noteworthy case in North Carolina,
the court held that where a testator drew lines through three
of the names of residuary legatees, there was a partial revocation good under the statute. The legacies were held to fall
into the residuum and to pass to the residuary legatees.
In a New Jersey case, the facts show that Sophia Kirkpatrick died in New Jersey, leaving a duly executed will.33
When the instrument was found in a trunk, it was discovered
that two dispositive clauses had been crossed out in ink; and in
the margin, a notation in the testatrix' handwriting to the effect that she wished the above mentioned clauses considered
erased. The Act of 1846 in this state provided that no revocation of a devise or any clause thereof, otherwise than by some
will in writing, or by burning, canceling, tearing or obliterating should be valid. The court held that the Act of 1851 in
which was provided that all written revocations must be
executed as wills, had no application in this instance. The
drawing of lines through the legacies was sufficient, the marginal notes merely showing that it was done by the testatrix.
It was held that "such canceling of a legacy by lines drawn by
a testator revokes the legacy so canceled, and does not affect
the residue of the will." The will, canceled clauses excepted,
was admitted to probate.
The case of Collard v. Collard8 is similarly significant. The
will of George W. Collard, duly executed, devised the testator's
entire estate to his second wife, Emily M. Collard, for life or
so long as she remained his widow and upon her death or
remarriage to his two sons, by his first marriage, in fee. After
his death the will was found with his wife's name erased
wherever it appeared in the instrument. It appeared that the
wife at the time of her marriage to George Collard had a husband living and undivorced. When that fact became known
to the testator, he erased her name from the will. The Orphan's
Court admitted the entire will to probate on the ground that
revocation enlarged the share of the sons in the residuary
clause and was therefore an alteration and void. The decision
was reversed on review. The court cited as authority on this
proposition, Jarman on Wills,

7

"If the words obliterated do

not give any person (apart from effect on residue) a larger
estate than he would have taken by the will, or a new estate,
the obliteration works a valid partial revocation. This appears
to be the effect of Swinton v. Bailey." The court held the New,
C. 574.
35 In the matter of the will of Sophia Kirkpatrick, 22 N. J. Eq. 463.
36 67 Atl. 190 (N. J. Unreported).
37 (5th ed.), I, 292.
34 169 N.
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Jersey statute permits revocation of any clause by obliteration,
etc.; this construction has never been questioned.
The obliteration of the clause giving a life estate to the wife
was an act of revocation and was held not to dispose of the
property, "Because the incidental effect of such revocation
increases the residue of the estate given the sons." In stating
the ambulatory character of a will the court went on to say,
"Once properly executed, the paper becomes a last will and
testament, subject to a revocatory act by the testator to the
extent he desires." It was noted that the legislature, which had
thrown all the safeguards around the execution of wills, had
remained silent as to any restraints on revocation other than
those long provided for by the statute. The court, in an apparent attempt to sustain its decision in this particular case, stated
that even if the surrogate had been correct, Mrs. Collard could
take nothing by the will as the gift was to her as wife and
limited to her as widow. As she could not answer either
description at the time the devise took effect, the court held
that the remainders to the sons would be accelerated.
From the cases herein noted it will be seen that in states
where the statute provides for the revocation of a will or any
part thereof, the courts which uphold partial revocation generally do so on the ground of the antiquity of the rule, and
because the local legislatures have, in the face of such decisions, made no changes in the statutes.38 This contention is not
without merit because of the desirability of uniform interpretation of the statutes. Courts which reach the opposite conclusion under similar statutes have done so -generally on the
ground that the attempted partial revocation amounted to a
new devise.""
Assuming the former doctrine to be correct on principle, as.
it seems to be on authority, the next and more important question is to attempt to determine from the cases cited the better
rule with regard to partial revocation under statutes which
refer only to the whole will, as is the case in Illinois. 40 On
examination, it appears that all of the cases under this type of
statute noted herein, except Bigelow v. Gillott, are in accord
with Casey v. Hogan, the instant case. The Massachusetts
court rested its decision on four propositions: first, that it had
been the uniform rule in that commonwealth under the first
statute, which was of the English Statute of Frauds type, that
partial revocation by act on instrument was effective; second,
38 Brown v. Brown, 91 S. C. 101; Barfield v. Carr, 169 N. C. 574;
In the Matter of the Will of Sophia Kirkpatrick, 22 N. J. Eq. 463.
89 Eschbach v. Collins, 61 Md. 478.
40 Cahill's Ill. Rev. St. 1931, Ch. 48, par. 19.
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that the court would not infer an intention of the legislature
to change this rule when the statute was changed to refer to
a will only; third, that the power to revoke a will contains the
power to revoke any part of it; and fourth, that to declare
against partial revocation by act on the instrument would necessarily lead to similar construction in cases of partial revocation by codicil.
This later contention has support from some writers of textbooks. Percy Bordwell in speaking of the construction of statutes similar to those in Illinois says that while there is authority for not allowing partial revocation by act on the will, "it
may well be doubted whether in failing to mention partial
revocations there was any more intention to preclude partial
revocations by act to the instrument than partial revocations
by subsequent instruments, with regard to which there can be
no question." 42 This position, however, appears to be untenable
for two reasons. Acts on the face of the will are, as pointed
out in the case of Law v. Law,4 3 equivocal in their nature, while
a codicil, which revokes a will only so far as inconsistent with
it, is an act protected by all the solemnities required by law.
It is fundamental also that a codicil republishes the will as of
the date of the codicil. It has therefore, the same effect, as a
destruction of the old will and the making of a new one. For
these reasons it cannot be considered to be an act on a parity
with an act on the will itself so far as partial revocation only
is concerned. The opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court, therefore appears sound on principle and in accord with the weight
of authority.
41 123 Mass. 102.
42 "Statute Law of Wills," 14 Iowa L. Rev. 290.
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